Preface
This volume contains the written versions of four courses plus the one seminar talk given at the Lluis A. Santaló Summer School, entitled "Recent Trends in Cryptography", and organized by the Real Sociedad Matemática Española (RSME). One of the objectives of the RSME is to present the challenges and opportunities that the modern Information Society offer to the mathematical community. Following this objective, the main goal of the Summer School was to give an overview of some recent mathematical methods used in cryptography and cryptanalysis. There were four courses given by well-known specialists plus several seminar talks and two round table discussions with representatives of the industry, administration, and research communities. The Summer School was held at the Universidad Internacional Menéndez Pelayo (UIMP) at the Palacio de la Magdalena in Santander (Spain) on July [11] [12] [13] [14] [15] 2005 .
The program of the school consisted of four courses taught by Tor Helleseth, Alfred Menezes, Phong Nguyen, and Igor Shparlinski. There were also talks by Amparo Fúster, Jaime Gutiérrez, Ignacio Luengo, and two round table discussions. The main topics were analysis of stream cyphers and public-key cryptography -a revolutionary idea introduced thirty years ago that has changed our lives in aspects such as the Internet and electronic commerce. All topics were of great interest for their applications to the different aspects of information security, such as authentication, digital signatures, smart cards, electronic voting, and the security of mobile phones. The course of T. Helleseth gave a very nice introduction to stream cyphers including the main mathematical aspect, such as boolean functions, and combination of stream cyphers, and algebraic and correlation attacks to such cyphers. The course of A. Menezes gave an introduction to pairing-based cryptography with elliptic curves and his main applications, such as short signatures and identity based encryption. This course presented some important developments in protocol design, Tate pairing computations, and selection of elliptic curves. The course of Phong Nguyen made a complete introduction to the mathematical techniques used in the cryptanalysis of public-key cryptosystems. It included a description of the main public-key cryptosystems, its security, and attacks. This course also presented an introduction to lattices and more advanced attacks based on them. The course of I. Shparlinski presented a survey of several recently suggested constructions of generating sequences of pseudorandom points on elliptic curves. Such constructions are of interest for both classical and elliptic curve cryptography and are also of intrinsic mathematical interest.
All this material is presented in this proceedings collection in an expository manner with many examples and references and will be very useful to graduate vii viii PREFACE students and research mathematicians and engineers interested in mathematical methods in cryptography and cryptanalysis.
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Introduction
Cellular Automata (CA) are particular forms of finite state machines that can be investigated by the usual analytic techniques ([10] , [17] , [19] , [25] ). CA have been used in application areas so different as physical system simulation, biological process, species evolution, socio-economical models or test pattern generation. They are defined as arrays of identical cells in an n-dimensional space and characterized by different parameters [26] : the cellular geometry, the neighborhood specification, the number of contents per cell and the transition rule to compute the successor state. Their simple, modular and cascable structure makes them very attractive for VLSI implementations.
On the other hand, Linear Feedback Shift Registers (LFSRs) [11] are linear structures currently used in the generation of pseudorandom sequences. The inherent simplicity of LFSRs, their ease of implementation and the good statistical properties of their output sequences turn them into natural building blocks for the design of pseudorandom sequence generators with applications in spread-spectrum communications, circuit testing, error-correcting codes, numerical simulations or cryptography.
In be obtained from one-dimensional CA too. In cryptographic applications, pseudorandom sequence generators currently involve several LFSRs combined by means of nonlinear functions or irregular clocking techniques (see [18] , [20] ). Moreover in [21] , it is proved that one-dimensional linear CA are isomorphic to conventional LFSRs. Thus, the latter structures can be simply substituted by the former ones in order to accomplish the same goal: generation of keystream sequences.
The above class of linear CA has been found to satisfy randomness properties with application in the testing of digital circuits, Built-In Self-Test (BIST) schemes and self-checking [27] . The current interest of these CA stems from the lack of correlation between the bit sequences generated by adjacent cells, see [9] . In this sense, linear CA are superior to the more common LFSRs [11] that have been traditionally used as pseudorandom pattern generators. Nevertheless, the main advantage of CA is that multiple generators designed as nonlinear structures in terms of LFSRs preserve the linearity when they are expressed under the form of CA.
This paper considers the problem of finding one-dimensional CA that reproduce the output sequence of a particular LFSR-based generator. More precisely, in this work a wide class of LFSR-based nonlinear generators, the so-called ClockControlled Shrinking Generators (CCSGs) [15] , can be described in terms of onedimensional CA configurations. Indeed, the well known Shrinking Generator [8] is just an element of such a class. The automata here presented unify in a simple structure the above mentioned class of sequence generators. The algorithm that converts a given CCSG into a CA-based linear model is very simple and can be applied to CCSGs in a range of practical interest. The underlying idea of this modelling procedure is the concatenation of a basic automaton. Once the generators have been linearized, a cryptanalytic approach to reconstruct the generated sequence is also presented.
The paper is organized as follows: in section 2, the basic structures considered, e.g. one-dimensional CA and CCSGs, are introduced. A simple algorithm to determine the pair of CA corresponding to a particular shrinking generator and its generalization to Clock-Controlled Shrinking Generators are given in sections 3 and 4, respectively. A method of reconstructing the generated sequence that exploits the linearity of the CA-based model is presented in section 5. Finally, conclusions in section 6 end the paper.
Basic Structures
In the following subsections, we introduce the general characteristics of the basic structures we are dealing with: one-dimensional cellular automata, the shrinking generator and the class of clock-controlled shrinking generators. The work is restricted to CA and LFSRs with binary contents. In addition, all the LFSRs here considered are maximal-length LFSRs, that is their output sequences are PNsequences and their characteristic polynomials are primitive polynomials, see [11] and [18] .
2.1. One-Dimensional Cellular Automata. One-dimensional cellular automata can be described as L-cell registers [4], whose cell contents are updated at the same time instant according to a particular k -variable function (the transition rule) denoted by Φ. If the function Φ is a linear function, so is the cellular automaton. In addition, for cellular automata with binary contents there can be up to In this paper, only transition rules with k = 3 will be considered. Thus, there are 2 8 of such rules among which just two (rule 90 and rule 150) lead to non trivial machines. Such rules are described as follows :
Rule 90
111 110 101 100 011 010 001 000 
For a cellular automaton of length L = 10 cells, configuration rules (
and initial state (0, 0, 0, 1, 1, 1, 0, 1, 1, 0), Table 1 illustrates the formation of its output sequences (binary sequences read vertically) and the succession of states (binary configurations of 10 bits read horizontally). For the above mentioned rules, the different states of the automaton are grouped in closed cycles. The number of different output sequences for a particular cycle is ≤ L as the same sequence (although shifted) may appear simultaneously in different cells. At the same time, all the sequences in a cycle will have the same period and linear complexity [17] . Moreover, any of the output sequence of the automaton can be produced at any cell provided that the right state cycle is chosen.
On the other hand, linear finite state machines are currently represented and analyzed by means of their transition matrices. The form and characteristics of these matrices for the CA under consideration can be found in [4] . In fact, such 
being P −1 (x) = 0 and P 0 (x) = 1. Next, the following definition is introduced:
Definition 2.1. A Multiplicative-Polynomial Cellular Automaton is defined as a cellular automaton whose characteristic polynomial is a reducible polynomial of the form P M (x) = (P (x)) p where p is a positive integer. If P (x) is a primitive polynomial, then the automaton is called a Primitive Multiplicative-Polynomial Cellular Automaton.
The class of binary sequence generators we are dealing with is described in the following subsections.
The Shrinking Generator.
The shrinking generator is a binary sequence generator [8] composed by two LFSRs : a control register SR 1 that decimates the sequence produced by the other register SR 2 . We denote by L j (j = 1, 2) their corresponding lengths with (L 1 , L 2 ) = 1 as well as L 1 < L 2 . Then, we denote by C j (x) ∈ GF (2)[x] (j = 1, 2) their corresponding characteristic polynomials of degree L j (j = 1, 2), respectively.
The sequence produced by SR 1 , denoted by {a i }, controls the bits of the sequence produced by SR 2 , that is {b i }, which are included in the output sequence {z j } (the shrunken sequence), according to the following rule P :
(
A simple example illustrates the behavior of this structure.
Example 2.2. Let us consider the following LFSRs:
(1) Register SR 1 of length L 1 = 3, characteristic polynomial C 1 (x) = 1 + x 2 + x 3 and initial state IS 1 = (1, 0, 0). The PN-sequence generated by SR 1 is {1, 0, 0, 1, 1, 1, 0} with period T 1 = 2 L 1 − 1 = 7. (2) Register SR 2 of length L 2 = 4, characteristic polynomial C 2 (x) = 1 + x + x 4 and initial state IS 2 = (1, 0, 0, 0). The PN-sequence generated by SR 2 is {1, 0, 0, 0, 1, 0, 0, 1, 1, 0, 1, 0, 1 In brief, the sequence produced by the shrinking generator is an irregular decimation of {b i } from the bits of {a i }. According to [8] , the period of the shrunken sequence is
and its linear complexity [20] , notated LC, satisfies the following inequality
A simple calculation, based on the fact that every state of SR 2 coincides once with every state of SR 1 , allows one to compute the number of 1's in the shrunken sequence. Such a number is constant and equal to
Comparing period and number of 1 s, it can be concluded that the shrunken sequence is a quasi-balanced sequence. In addition, it can be proved [8] that the output sequence has good distributional statistics too. Therefore, this scheme is suitable for practical implementation of stream ciphers and pattern generators.
The Clock-Controlled Shrinking Generators. The Clock-Controlled
Shrinking Generators constitute a wide class of clock-controlled sequence generators [15] with applications in cryptography, error correcting codes and digital signature. An CCSG is a sequence generator composed of two LFSRs notated SR 1 and SR 2 . The parameters of both registers are defined as those of subsection 2.2. At any time t, SR 1 (the control register) is clocked normally while the second register SR 2 is clocked a number of times given by an integer decimation function notated X t . In fact, if A 0 (t), A 1 (t), . . . , A L 1 −1 (t) are the binary cell contents of SR 1 at time t, then X t is defined as (2.6)
In this way, the output sequence of an CCSG is obtained from a double decimation:
(1) The output sequence of SR 2 , {b i }, is decimated by means of X t giving rise to the sequence {b i }. (2) The same decimation rule P , defined in subsection 2.2, is applied to the sequence {b i }.
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Remark that if X t ≡ 1 (no cells are selected in SR 1 ), then the proposed generator is just the shrinking generator. Let us see a simple example of CCSG.
Example 2.3. For the same LFSRs defined in the previous example and the function X t = 1 + 2 0 A 0 (t) with w = 1, the decimated sequence {b i } is given by:
• {b i } → 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 .....
• X t → 2 1 1 2 2 2 1 2 1 1 2 2 2 1 2 1 1 2 2 .....
• {b i } → 1 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 ..... According to the decimation function X t , the underlined bits 0 or 1 in {b i } are discarded in order to produce the sequence {b i }. Then the output sequence {z j } of the CCSG is given by:
• In brief, the sequence produced by an CCSG is an irregular double decimation of the sequence generated by SR 2 from the function X t and the bits of SR 1 . This construction allows one to generate a large family of different sequences by using the same LFSR initial states and characteristic polynomials but modifying the decimation function. Period, linear complexity and statistical properties of the generated sequences by CCSGs have been established in [15] . (Table II, page 334) . It is shown that the number of operations grows linearly with the degree of the polynomial, so the method does not suffer from any sort of exponential blow-up. The method is efficient for all practical applications (e.g. in 1996 finding a pair of length 300 CA took 16 CPU seconds on a SPARC 10 workstation). For cryptographic applications, the degree of the irreducible (primitive) polynomial is L 2 ≈ 64, so that the consuming time is negligible.
Cattel and Muzio Synthesis
Finally, a list of One-Dimensional Linear Hybrid Cellular Automata of Degree Through 500 can be found in [6] .
CA-Based Linear Models for the Shrinking Generator
In this section, an algorithm to determine the pair of CA corresponding to a given shrinking generator is presented. Such an algorithm is based on the following results:
Lemma 3.1. The characteristic polynomial of the shrunken sequence is of the form P (x) N , where
is a L 2 -degree primitive polynomial and N is an integer satisfying the inequality 2 
to the primality of L 2 and L 1 , the result of the decimation of {b i } is a PNsequence of primitive characteristic polynomial P (x) of degree L 2 . Moreover, the number of times that this PN -sequence is repeated coincides with the number of 1 s in {a i } since each 1 of {a i } provides the shrunken sequence with 2 L 2 − 1 digits of {b i }. Consequently, the characteristic polynomial of the shrunken sequence will be P (x) N with N ≤ 2 (L 1 −1) . The lower limit follows immediately from equation (2.4) that defines the linear recurrence relationship.
being E an integer given by
Proof. As the decimation of the sequence {b i } is realized taking one out of 2 L 1 − 1 digits, the obtained PN -sequence is nothing but the characteristic sequence associated to the cyclotomic coset E = 2 L 1 − 1, see [11] . Hence, the roots of its characteristic polynomial will be λ
According to the definition of cyclotomic coset, the value of E is given by equation (3.2).
Remark that P (x) depends exclusively on the characteristic polynomial of the register SR 2 and on the length L 1 of the register SR 1 . Based on the Cattell and Muzio synthesis algorithm [5] , the following result is derived: 
where S i is the binary string s i whose least significant bit has been complemented, S * i is the mirror image of S i and the symbol * denotes concatenation.
Proof. The result is just a generalization of the Cattell and Muzio synthesis algorithm. The concatenation is due to the fact that rule 90 (150) at the end of the array in null automata is equivalent to two consecutive rules 150 (90) with identical sequences. The fact of that an automaton and its reversal version have the same characteristic polynomial completes the proof.
Proceeding in the same way a number of times, a multiplicative-polynomial cellular automaton 2.1 is obtained. In this way, the construction of a linear structure from the concatenation of a basic automaton is accomplished.
According to the previous results, an algorithm to linearize the shrinking generator is introduced: Step 1: From L 1 and C 2 (x), compute the polynomial
Step 2: From P (x), apply the Cattell and Muzio synthesis algorithm to determine two linear CA (with rules 90 and 150), notated s i , whose characteristic polynomial is P (x). Remark 3.4. In this algorithm the characteristic polynomial of the register SR 1 is not needed. Thus, all the shrinking generators with the same SR 2 but different registers SR 1 (all of them with the same length L 1 ) can be modelled by the same pair of one-dimensional linear CA.
Remark 3.5. It can be noticed that the computation of both CA is proportional to L 1 concatenations. Consequently, the algorithm can be applied to shrinking generators in a range of practical application.
Remark 3.6. In contrast to the nonlinearity of the shrinking generator, the CA-based models that generate the shrunken sequence are linear.
In order to clarify the previous steps a simple numerical example is presented.
Input: A shrinking generator characterized by two LFSRs SR 1 of length L 1 = 3 and SR 2 of length L 2 = 5 and characteristic polynomial C 2 (x) = 1 + x + x 2 + x 4 + x 5 .
Step 1: P (x) is the characteristic polynomial of the cyclotomic coset E = 7. Thus,
Step 2: From P (x) and applying the Cattell and Muzio synthesis algorithm, two reversal linear CA whose characteristic polynomial is P (x) can be determined. Such CA are written in binary format as: In this way, we have obtained a pair of linear CA able to generate the shrunken sequence corresponding to the given shrinking generator. In addition, for each one of the previous automata there is one state cycle where the shrunken sequence is generated at each one of the cells.
CA-Based Linear Models for the Clock-Controlled Shrinking Generators
In this section, an algorithm to determine the pair of one-dimensional linear CA corresponding to a given CCSG is presented. Such an algorithm is based on the following results:
Lemma 4.1. The characteristic polynomial of the output sequence of a CCSG is of the form P (x) N , where
is a primitive L 2 -degree polynomial and N is an integer satisfying the inequality 2
Proof. The proof is analogous to that one developed in lemma 3.1.
Remark that, according to the structure of the CCSGs, the polynomial P (x) depends on the characteristic polynomial of the register SR 2 , the length L 1 of the register SR 1 and the decimation function X t . Before, P (x) was the characteristic polynomial of the cyclotomic coset E, where E = 2 0 + 2 1 + . . . + 2 L 1 −1 was a fixed separation distance between the digits drawn from the sequence {b i }. Now, this distance D is variable as well as a function of X t . The computation of D gives rise to the following result:
Proof. The proof is analogous to that one developed in lemma 3.2. In fact, the distance D can be computed taking into account that the function X t takes values in the interval [1, 2, . . . , 2 w ] and the number of times that each one of these values appears in a period of the output sequence is given by 2 L 1 −w . A simple computation, based on the sum of the terms of an arithmetic progression, completes the proof.
From the previous results, it can be noticed that the algorithm that determines the pair of CA corresponding to a given CCSG is analogous to that one developed in section 3. Indeed, the expression of E in equation (3.2) must be replaced by the expression of D in equation (4.1). In order to clarify the previous steps a simple numerical example is presented.
Input:
A CCSG characterized by: Two LFSRs SR 1 of length L 1 = 3 and SR 2 of length L 2 = 5 and characteristic polynomial C 2 (x) = 1 + x + x 2 + x 4 + x 5 plus the decimation function X t = 1 + 2 0 A 0 (t) + 2 1 A 1 (t) + 2 2 A 2 (t) with w = 3.
Step 1: P (x) is the characteristic polynomial of the cyclotomic coset D. Now D ≡ 4 mod 31, that is we are dealing with the cyclotomic coset 1. Thus, the corresponding characteristic polynomial is:
P (x) = 1 + x + x 2 + x 4 + x 5 .
Step 2: From P (x) and applying the Cattell and Muzio synthesis algorithm, two reversal linear CA whose characteristic polynomial is P (x) can be determined. Such CA are written in binary format as: Remark 4.3. From a point of view of the CA-based linear models, the shrinking generator or any one of the CCGS are entirely analogous. Thus, the fact of introduce an additional decimation function does neither increase the complexity of the generator nor improve its resistance against cryptanalytic attacks. Indeed, both kinds of generators can be linearized by the same class of CA-based models.
A Cryptanalytic Approach to this Class of Sequence Generators
Since CA-based linear models describing the behavior of CCSGs have been derived, a cryptanalytic attack that exploits the weaknesses of these models has been also developed. It consists in determining the initial states of both registers SR 1 and SR 2 from an amount of CCSG output sequence (the intercepted sequence). In this way, the rest of the output sequence can be reconstructed. For the sake of simplicity, the attack will be illustrated for the shrinking generator although the process can be extended to any CCSG. The proposed attack is divided into two different phases:
Phase 1: From bits of the intercepted sequence and using the CA-based linear models, additional bits of the shrunken sequence can be reconstructed. Phase 2: Due to the intrinsic characteristics of this class of generators, a cryptanalytic attack can be mounted in order to determine the initial
